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Mixed Signals: A Look at Louisiana's Experience with
Harmless Error in Criminal Cases
Addison K. Goff, IV
Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through it in
swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession. Many are plainly
harmless; some appear ominously harmful. Some, for all the benign
appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of
followers that deplete trials of fairness.
The well-being of the law encompasses a tolerance for harmless errors
adrift in an imperfect world. Its well-being must also encompass the
capacity to ward off the destroyers. So an inquiry into what makes an
error harmless, though one of philosophical tenor, is also an intensely
practical inquiry into the health and sanitation of the law.'
I. INTRODUCTION
"There is good news, and there is bad news. First the good news: The
court below erroneously admitted the coerced confession. And now the bad
news: The error was harmless and the conviction stands." Recently, holdings
such as this hypothetical one have become substantially more common in the
realm of criminal law. Accordingly, the harmless error doctrine has become the
very essence of criminal law today.2 Although this doctrine effectuates several
strong policy considerations, American courts have been, with only minimal
analysis, raking more and more errors under this rule.3 Moreover, when the
courts have analyzed the harmless error issue with any detail, their standards of
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I. Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, Foreword (1970).
2. Professor Goldberg has estimated that approximately ten percent of appellate criminal cases
throughout the country are determined by a finding of harmless constitutional error. Steven H.
Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 421 (1980).
See also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 750, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2084 (1993) ("[H]arnless error
review has become an integral component of our criminal justice system.").
3. Interestingly, Dean Paul M. Hebert predicted in 1932: "[l]n spite of these general
principles, which, if adhered to, would prevent reversals where justice has been done, in dealing with
the various classes of cases in which the problems arise we will note a tendency of the Supreme Court
to reverse many criminal cases when the error might properly be considered harmless." Paul M.
Hebert, The Problem of Reversible Error In Louisiana, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 169, 184 (1932) (emphasis
added).
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analysis have not been consistent. The trend seems to be that the criminal will
not go free-regardless of the magnitude of the constable's blunder (or anyone
else's blunder).'
In analyzing Louisiana's standard of appellate review s of error in criminal
cases, the writer will first discuss the origin of the harmless error doctrine.
Second, the writer will examine the policies surrounding the doctrine, as well as
the various "tests" the courts have used. Third, the writer will specifically
analyze Louisiana's experience with the doctrine with a view toward determining
the present state of Louisiana law on this subject. Finally, the writer will
recommend a preferred standard of review.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE
A. The Origin of the Harmless Error Rule in England
The original rule of harmless error in the English system was that an error
by the court in admitting or rejecting a piece of evidence was not, standing
alone, sufficient grounds for setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial,
unless after considering all the evidence, it appeared to the judge that the truth
had not been reached.6 This rule lasted until 1835, when the Court of Exche-
quer announced a rule-that an error in the judge's ruling created a "per se"
right to a new trial for the defeated party.7 This rule became known as the
"Exchequer Rule."
Under the Exchequer Rule, an error concerning the admission or rejection
of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice. The English courts
stringently applied this presumption--even to the most insignificant items of
evidence. As a result, retrials became so commonplace in England that the
litigation "seemed to survive until -the parties expired."'
Parliament responded to this problem with the Judicature Act of 1873. This
act precluded a new trial unless "in the opinion of the Court of Appeal some
substantial Wrong or miscarriage has thereby been occasioned."' Although the
act did not define the phrases'"substantial wrong" and "miscarriage of justice,"
it did direct the courts to look to the actual impact of the error on the outcome
of the proceeding."0
4. People v. DeFore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (opinion of Cardozo, J.).
5. The harmless error doctrine is applied principally during appellate review; however, it also
may be applied at the trial level by a judge who becomes convinced that certain evidence was
improperly admitted when faced with the question of whether to grant a new trial. McCormick on
Evidence § 182 at n.2 (Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCormick].
6. I John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 21, at 884 (Tillers rev. 1983).
This rule existed for both civil and criminal cases.
7. Crease v. Barrett, I C.M. & R. 919 (1835), cited in Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 889.
8. Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 27.6, at 1160 (2d ed. 1992).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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B. The Evolution of America's Harmless Error Rule
1. The Roots
Although Americancourts adopted their own version of the Exchequer Rule,
they were not as readily influenced by England's rejection of it. The American
courts extended the rule to a much broader spectrum of errors." For example,
in State v. Sheppard," the defendant was charged with one of the foulest and
most brutal murders recorded in the annals of crime." During the trial a
witness for the state testified, in the absence of the defendant, as follows:
Q: What is your name, please?
A: Flora Ayers.
Q: What is your husband's name?
A: Jont Ayers. 4
The court noticed that the defendant was still in jail and suspended trial until the
defendant was present. After the defendant was brought in, the prosecutor asked
the witness the same questions, to which the witness responded with the same
answers. Although the defense did not object or take an exception at the time,
at the conclusion of trial, he did move to have the judgment arrested and the
verdict thereby set aside. The trial court denied the motion.'"
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
noted:
Johnson, P., quotes and approves the strongest part of the opinion in
Jackson's Case and then says: "We will not inquire whether the
prisoner was unfavorably or otherwise affectedby the cross-examination
of the witness in his absence.. . . He had the right to observe every
look, gesture, or move of the witness while he was -testifying; and it
mattered not that the court excluded the evidence and certified that it
was repeated in his presence." From these authorities it is clearly a
matter of no consequence that the evidence introduced in this case in the
absence of the prisoner may not have affected him, and that he did not
at the time take an exception.. . . [S]uch an error cannot be cured."
There was a similar result closer to home in State v. Larocca."' In that
case, the defendant stood trial for having carnal knowledge with a girl under
11. Id.
12. 39 S.E. 676 (W. Va. 1901).
13. Id. at 677-78. Mr. Sheppard was accused of ax-murdering his wife and seven year old child.
14. Id. at 688.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 689-90.
17. 156 La. 567, 100 So. 720 (1924).
1999]
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eighteen years old. Accordingly, one element that the prosecution had to prove
was that the victim was under eighteen years old. To prove this element, the
prosecution calledthe victim's mother to the stand. On direct examination the
mother had trouble remembering the date of her daughter's birth. On cross-
examination the defense counsel brought out the fact that the mother could not
remember the birthdates of the rest of her five children. The mother then
testified that the only knowledge she had as to the victim's birthdate was from
a birth certificate. Although the trial court would not allow the certificate into
evidence, the court did not preclude the witness from testifying. The supreme
court held that since the certificate was not a "contemporaneous memorandum
made by the witness herself at the time, it could not be used for the purpose of
refreshing her memory" s The court considered the error as well as the trial
judge's instruction to the jury: "Age, however, can be proven by witnesses who
know the age of a person, or by the mother of the person or by baptismal
records."'9 The court noted that since the jury could have given effect to both
what was said by the witness with reference to the certificate and to its physical
production and identification as such in the jury's presence, the conviction had
to be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial.
On rehearing in State v. Larocca,20 the Louisiana Supreme Court again
dealt with the issue of harmless error. In Larocca's second trial, the prosecution
had attempted to prove the victim's age by the testimony of a priest. The priest
stated that he had baptized the victim when she was a month old. The priest
produced the record he had made at the baptism. The defense counsel objected
to the testimony because the priest's only first-hand knowledge of the baby's age
was what the baby's mother had told him, that is, the statement was hearsay.
The court overruled the objection, and the defense counsel reserved the bill of
exceptions. Larocca was again convicted.
On appeal the court rejected the argument that the admission of the hearsay
evidence as to the victim's age was harmless because the jurors saw her and
thereby had an opportunity to judge her age. The court stated:
When illegal evidence has been received on behalf of the state, in proof
of a matter of importance in a criminal prosecution, the trial is illegal,
no matter how much legal evidence was received. In such case, we
cannot know whether a conviction' is founded only upon the legal
evidence or wholly or in part upon the illegal evidence.2
The court would retry Larocca for a third time.2"
18. Id. at 572, 100 So. at 721.
19. Id. (emphasis in original).
20. 157 La. 50, 101 So. 868 (1924) (on rehearing).
21. Id. at 55, 101 So. at 869 (emphasis added).
22. Although this result may be contrary to certain policy notions behind the harmless error
rule, namely judicial efficiency, it does seem to be in line with the often-disregarded promise to a
citizen that he is entitled to a fair trial.
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. Regardless of the propriety or impropriety of this trend, decisions such as
this apparently raised neither the legal profession's nor the criminal justice
system's image in the public eye. The American people considered the appellate
courts as "impregnable citadels of technicality" in criminal matters.23 This
public disapproval eventually spurred the legislatures around the country to create
statutory regulations to govern the treatment of trial court errors on appeal. The
enactment of the legislation was inevitable. Just as much then as now, courts are
not entirely free from public sentiment.24 Furthermore, as the crime situation
worsens, it appears likely that fewer convictions will be overturned on appeal and
stricter legislation will be passed.
In 1919, Congress passed the first of its harmless error statutes. This statute
eventually became 28 U.S.C. § 2111, and it currently provides as follows: "On
the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give
judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.""5 Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 52(a) provides quite similarly: "Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded."" All of the states that did not already have harmless error
statutes of their own eventually followed suit. 7 Indeed, Louisiana adopted its
first harmless error statute in 1928.28 The problem, however, is that the courts
have not consistently applied these statutes.
2.. The Jurisprudence
Although there is a plethora of cases construing the harmless error rule,29
there have been several seminal cases. In Kotteakos v. United States,9 the
23. Hon. Marcus A. Kavanaugh, Improvement ofAdministration of Criminal Justice by Exercise
of Judicial Power, I I A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925). Accord John H. Wigmore, Criminal Procedure:
"Good" Reversals and "Bad" Reversals, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 352(1909). See, e.g., Brain v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 18 S. Ct. 183 (1897); People v. Bell, 53 Cal. 119 (1878).
24. LaFave, supra note 8, at 1160-61. As Professor Saltzburg notes, the appellate courts were
appropriate targets for public criticism because the public wanted the convictions that were provided
by the trial courts. Thus, even if the reversal was for a good reason, the public would likely
disapprove, and the outcry would be even louder if the conviction were reversed on a technicality.
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 1006 n.56 (1973).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982).
26. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The text of this statute is very close to that of Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 921: "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court
because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the
accused." The evolution of Article 921 will be discussed Infra.
27. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). For a list of the
early decisions and statutes of the various jurisdictions, see Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 373 et seq.
28. La. R.S. 15:557 (1928 La. Acts, No. 2, § 1, art. 557).
29. As of 1980, Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, itself has been cited over 6000 times
in Shepard's U.S. Citations. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 421 n.2.
30. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946).
11731999)
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Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether the petitioners [had] suffered
substantial prejudice from being convicted of a single general conspiracy by
evidence which the government admit[ted] proved not one conspiracy [as was
charged in the indictment], but some eight or more different ones of the same
sort executed through a common key figure."'" In construing the federal
harmless error rule, the Court provided the following standard:
If, when all is said and done, the [court] is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a
constitutional norm or specific command of Congress. But if one
cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened
without stripping the erroneous, action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to
conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot
be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from
the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error
itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt,
the conviction cannot stand."
To show the shift in the federal jurisprudence, Kotteakos can be contrasted
with the more recent and probably most seminal33 case of Chapman v.
California.4 There, the Court tackled the question of the applicability of
harmless error rules to federal constitutional errors. The defendants had been
convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and murder s. 3  At the trial of these charges,
the prosecutor, pursuant to the express wording of Article I, section 13 of the
California Constitution,3" took advantage of the defendants' failure to testify.
31. Id. at752, 66 S. Ct. at 1241.
32. Id. at 764-65, 66 S. Ct. at 1247 (footnotes and citations omitted).
33. See Goldberg, supra note 2.
34. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). Although there have been many "harmless error" cases
out of the United States Supreme Court since 1967 and between 1946 and 1967, Chapman was
chosen because it is the "seed" of Louisiana's construction and application of the harmless error rule,
notwithstanding the fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court has relied heavily on language from
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, Ii S. Ct. 1246 (1991), and other cases from that court.
Compare Chapman to State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980) and State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d
1125 (La. 1991). For other United States Supreme Court cases since Chapman, see California v.
Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 117 S. Ct. 337 (1996); O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995);
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 750, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,
113 S. Ct. 1710 (1992); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391. 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478
U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S. Ct. 725 (1986);
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978); and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250, 89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969).
35. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18-19, 87 S. Ct. at 825.
36. California Constitution article 1, section 13 provided in pertinent part as follows: "[lI]n any
criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony
any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel,
1174 [Vol. 59
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Following the California Constitution, the trial court instructed the jury that
adverse inferences could be drawn from the defendants' failure to testify."
. Between the trial and the time that Chapman's case reached the state's high
court, the United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v. California,38 held that a
practice of inferring guilt from a defendant's decision not to testify was in
violation of the United States Constitution. The California Supreme Court.
nonetheless affirmed Chapman's conviction because, in its opinion, there was no
"miscarriage of justice" as per California's own harmless error provision. 9 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the error
was subject to a harmless error analysis and, if so, whether the error was in fact
harmless.
Justice Black, for the majority, wrote the opinion with a four-step analysis.
First, since it was a federal right that was violated, federal law, rather than state
law should apply.4" Second, in noting the utility of the harmless error rules, he
decided that in some cases some constitutional errors are so unimportant and
insignificant that, consistent with the federal constitution, they may be deemed
harmless."' Third, in noting the possible drawbacks of harmless error rules, he
utilized the Court's preferred federal harmless error rule: Is there "a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction."' 2 Finally, in applying the harmless error rule to the facts of the
case, he reasoned that "[s]uch a machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitu-
tional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners' version of the evidence
worthless, can no more be considered harmless than the introduction against the
defendant of a coerced confession."' 3
Although the Court ultimately remanded for a new trial, the case would have
numerous repercussions in the realm of criminal law. No longer did the
harmless error rule apply only to evidentiary rulings. As the Supreme Court has
become more conservative throughout the 1970's and up to today, the Court has
raked more errors beneath the umbrella of the federal harmless error rule. This
trend has been both lauded and criticized." Thus, the policies underlying the
harmless error rule must be examined in order to analyze Louisiana's use of the
doctrine.
and may be considered by the court or the jury."
37. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18-19, 87 S. Ct. at 825.
38. 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965).
39. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20, 87 S. Ct. at 826.
40. Id. at 20-21, 87 S. Ct. at 826-27.
41. Id. at 22, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
42. Id. at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827 (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87. 84 S. Ct. 229,
230 (1963)).
43. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26, 87 S. Ct. at 829. Cf Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111
S. CL 1246 (1991).
44. See generally Wigniore, supra note 6, § 21 and Traynor, supra note I.
1999] 1175
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III. THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE
A. Point-Counterpoint: The Policy Behind the Harmless Error Rule
The rationale for regarding some errors as harmless rests largely upon
considerations of economy and judicial efficiency."' But what has happened to
those policies which spurred the Exchequer-type rules in the first place? One
policy that must be kept in mind when considering an application of the harmless
error rule is the distinction between the roles of the jury and the appellate
court."' It is the juror who determines facts, not the appellate judge. Thus, an
appellate court's review of the facts of a trial can be said to be a usurpation of
the fundamental rights to a jury and a fair trial. 7
However, some would say that this theory is absurd because it ignores the
doctrine and history of the jury function, for it has always been under the control
and correction of the trial and appellate courts."' The judge determines
questions of fact upon which the admissibility of evidence depends. Further-
more, the judge determines whether the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury
and whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. "The 'usurpation,'
if any, consists in setting aside the verdict, not in confirming it."'4 9
Is this theory necessarily so absurd? Generally, a defendant would not allow
an appellate judge to sit on a jury. At the least the defendant would find out
who the judge was before failing to exercise a peremptory challenge. Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that an attorney would try a case to a panel of
appellate judges, he would not agree to waive his closing argument, nor to allow
the new "jury" to know that a previous jury found the defendant guilty. Nor
would the attorney allow the members of the "jury" to go back to their offices
and review their notes at their own pace until they reach a decision. Any
attorney who would agree to these circumstances would probably not have a
problem with a three-person jury convicting the defendant by a vote of two to
one.
50
45. McCormick, supra note 5, § 182.
46. The relevance of this distinction will become more apparent in the next section, which
concerns the different approaches used in determining whether a particular error is harmless.
47. Cf Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130,99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 92 S. Ct. 1628 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970); and Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968). These decisions form the criminal defendant's
right to trial by jury.
48. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 889.
49. Id. In a quite poetic response to the theory of these rights, Wigmore wrote:
As well might a gardener cut down a thriving vine because his henchman has used a hoe
instead of a spade in planting it; or a farmer bring valuable bantams to the block because
they were hatched by a meddlesome duck instead of their lawful parent. A glance at
common affairs will awaken us to the intrinsic absurdity of the theory of "legal right."
Id. at 369.
50. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 430-31.
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Furthermore, although a criminal defendant is not entitled to a perfect
trial," one must remember that evidentiary rules are not designed in a vacuum.
Each rule, by balancing probative value, by excluding unreliable evidence, by
barring extraneous matter, and by guiding the judge and jury in the proper
performance of their decision-making function, is intended to play a role in
guaranteeing a fair trial. Each rule reflects the policy of the state with respect
to fairness regardless of the identity of the defendant.5 2 "[T]he safeguards of
liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people."5
Another policy factor that must be considered is the harmless error rule's
promotion of prosecutorial misconduct. It has been said that the harmless error
rule, as recently applied, "tacitly informs prosecutors that they can weigh the
commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not against a legal or ethical
standard of appropriate conduct, but rather, against an increasingly accurate
prediction that the appellate courts will ignore the misconduct when sufficient
evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt." 4 Moreover, even in cases in
which the evidence does not weigh heavily against the defendant, the increasing
possibility of an error being said to be harmless can give the prosecutor an
incentive to act unethically; for, in such a situation, "he has nothing to lose and
everything to gain" through the unethical behavior.55
51. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S. Ct. 481 (1953).
52. Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 989.
53. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S. Ct. 430, 436 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
54. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 425 (1992).
55. Id. at 431. Professor Gershman cites the following cases and explanations for situations
in which federal courts have found prosecutorial misconduct harmless:
United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 133 (1991)
(prosecutor's allusions to greed in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice were not sufficiently
shown to be anti-Semitic references, although prosecutor "could have chosen his words
more carefully"); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1991)
(prosecutor "mischaracterized the jury's role" by alluding to the grand jury's indictment
as proof that case was a "federal case" but remarks were harmless); Fisher v. Nix, 920
F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's "misleading" remarks were harmless); United
States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1425 (10th Cir. 1990) (court does not decide whether
prosecutor's "highly improper" remarks that denigrated role ofjury would have been basis
for reversal); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1990)
(prosecutor's appeal to jury to act as conscience of the community not improper when not
"intended to inflame"); United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 1990)
(prosecutor's remarks that defendant [was] a "liar," a "clumsy, thick tongued thug," and
a "bozo" were improper but harmless); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 894-95
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991) (prosecutor's statement that
defendant used tactics favored by Adolf Hitler were inflammatory but harmless); United
States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct.
1138 and 493 U.S. 1094, 110 S. Ct. 1167 (1991) (prosecutor's inflammatory statement
that drugs "are poisoning our community and our kids die because of this" [were]
harmless); United States v. Parker, 869 F.2d 1377 (IOh Cir. 1989) (inflammatory
11771999)
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Although these comments may be said to be a bit hyperbolic, they do show
the need for great care by the courts when making determinations of harmless-
ness-especially since it appears that the harmless error rule is here to stay.
B. Different Approaches for Demonstrating Harmlessness
Although the Supreme Court espoused several fundamental principles in
Chapman, which have been somewhat consistently followed, the content of the
federal standard has not always been explicitly addressed. Given the necessity
of showing harmlessness "beyond a reasonable doubt," the question remains how
to make this showing of "harmlessness."
1. The Federal Approaches
American courts have approached the issue of harmlessness in a variety of
ways.5' The methods of analysis used differ in light of the particular court's
focus; that is, when determining whether a given error is harmless, a court will
reference to victim's death was harmless); Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990); United States v. Hernandez,
865 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1989) (improper racial reference to "Cuban drug dealer"
harmless); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 158-59 (Ist Cir. 1989)(prosecutor's reference to defendant as "liar" and "crook" was improper but harmless);
Hopkinson v. Shillenger, 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's expression of fear
after murder of prospective witness was improper but harmless); Shepard v. Lane, 818
F.2d 615, 621-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929, 108 S. CL 296 (1987) (calling
defendant liar, dog, animal, and stating it was too bad arresting officer had not broken
defendant's skull "grossly improper" but harmless); Clark v. Wood, 823 F.2d 1241, 1251(8th Cir.), cer. denied, 484 U.S. 945. 108 S. Ct. 334 (1987) (calling defendant a master
liar, and that many persons believe he is "100% guilty" was improper but harmless);
United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1395 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1068, 108 S. CL 1034 (1988) (derogatory remarks about defense lawyer (were] improper
but harmless); United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
855, 108 S. Ct. 162 (1987) (comparing defendant's denial of criminal intent with Peter's
denial of Christ was grossly improper but harmless); United States v. Lowenberg, 853
F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032, 109 S. CL 1070 (1989)(calling defendant a "filthy pimp" and his lawyer a "jack-in-the-box" for making repeated
objections [was] improper but harmless); United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408,1428-29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S. Ct. 2857 and 488 U.S. 1011, 109
S. Ct. 799 (1989) (inflammatory remarks about defense counsel were harmless); UnitedStates v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1049-50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1024, 108 S.
Ct. 1999 (1988) (claiming that defense counsel subomed perjury was "reprehensible" but
harmless).
Id. at 428 n. 226.
56. Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Erro--A Process
In Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15. 16 (1976); Traynor, supra note I; Wigmore, supra
note 6, § 21, at 889 et seq.
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typically analyze the nature of the error, 7 the strength or presence of the
remaining, properly-admitted evidence,5" or the trial court's verdict.5 9
In Chapman v. California,' the Court, rejecting tests which focus on the
remaining, properly-admitted evidence,6' relied on the test espoused in its
earlier decision of Fahy v. Connecticut:'2 Is there "a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."6 This
test focuses on the improperly-admitted evidence or the actual error. A court
employing this test considers the possible effect the actual error had on the
verdict."
In Harrington v. California s -the United States Supreme Court apparently
used another test. The Court focused on the duplicative or cumulative nature of
the excluded evidence, that is, the Court analyzed whether there was properly-
admitted evidence which tended to prove the same thing as the erroneously-
admitted evidence. In Harrington, the trial court, in violation of Bruton v.
United States,' admitted confessions of two codefendants who did not take the
stand at the defendant's trial. The confessions placed the defendant at the scene
of the crime; however, several eyewitnesses and the defendant's own statement
also placed the defendant at the scene. Furthermore, the third codefendant, who
did take the stand, placed Harrington at the scene with a gun in his hand. Justice
Douglas for the majority concluded that since the statement of the defendant that
put him at the scene and the confession of the third codefendant were cumulative
with the erroneously-admitted confessions, the Bruton violation did not harm the
defendant.6
7
In Milton v. Wainwright," the Supreme Court indicated that consideration
of the untainted evidence would not be limited to precisely matching cumulative
evidence. This case dealt with the harmlessness of the admission of the
57. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, II1 S. CL 1246 (1991); State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d
1125 (La. 1991) (on remand from the United States Supreme Court, 498 U.S. 39, I11 S. CL 328
(1990)).
58. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969).
59. Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967); State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 421
(La. 1980).
60. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct 824 (1967).
61. Id. at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
62. 375 U.S. 85, 84 S. Ct. 229 (1963).
63. Id. at 86-87, 84 S. CL at 230. For a discussion of Chapman, see supra text accompanying
notes 34-45.
64. See generally Traynor, supra note I, at 22-25.
65. 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969).
66. 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that when the
state puts two defendants on trial in the same case, any statement made by one defendant, which
inculpates the other defendant, cannot be admitted at the trial if the codefendant does not take the
stand.
67. The Court did note that, apart from the confessions, the evidence against the defendant was
overwhelming. Harrington, 390 U.S. at 254, 89 S. Ct. at 1728.
68. 407 U.S. 371, 92 S. Ct. 2174 (1972).
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defendant's confession. The Court held that even if the confession had been
taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the defendant suffered no prejudice,
because the record included properly-admitted evidence that overwhelmingly
pointed to the defendant's guilt.69 This test had been expressly repudiated less
than ten years earlier in Chapman.'°
Professor Field notes that it is possible to come up with a situation in which
a conviction may be reversed under the "overwhelming evidence" test and not
under the "contributed-to-the-verdict" approach.7 For example, a particular
constitutional error, if viewed in alone, may lead a court to conclude that it could
not have possibly influenced the jury. (For example, a defendant may have
given an exculpatory statement without first having been given his Miranda"'
warnings.) However, the other evidence in the case may fall short of being
"overwhelming," while still being sufficient to sustain the verdict.7"
Field also notes that different results can be achieved by switching between
an analysis using the "overwhelming evidence" approach and the "cumulative"
evidence approach. For example, a defendant makes, on five different occasions,
five identical statements to the police. All of the statements deny guilt, but they
incriminate the defendant by placing him at the scene of the crime and thus
provide a critical link in the chain of evidence against him. The first four
statements were volunteered, but the fifth was given in violation of Miranda.
The prosecutor introduced all statements at trial. The "cumulative evidence"
approach would find the fifth statement harmless because it is identical in content
to the other four statements. The "overwhelming evidence" test would, standing
alone, find the admission harmless if the remaining evidence was compelling, as
opposed to simply legally sufficient. 4 Although these different "tests" are
essentially aimed at the same target--determining whether the error was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"-courts that are less sympathetic to the
69. Although the challenged confession was described as containing "incriminating statements
... essentially the same as those given in the prior confessions .... " the majority did not
characterize it as "cumulative." Id. at 375-76, 92 S. Ct. at 2177.
70. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). This test was
apparently also repudiated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764,66 S. Ct. 1239, 1247-48(1946). Section 167 of Sir James F. Stephen's Indian Evidence Act represents yet another approach
to the determination of an error's harmlessness. That act provided:
The improper admission of rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new
trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which
such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there
was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been
received, it ought not to have varied the decision.
Indian Evidence Act § 167 (Stephen's ed. 1872), quoted In Wigmore, supra note 6, § 21, at 888 n.8.
71. For convenience, the writer will use Professor Field's terminology and refer to the
Chapman-type test as the "contributed-to-the-verdict' test, the Harrington-type test as the "cumulative
evidence" test, and the Milton-type test as the "overwhelming evidence" test.
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
73: Field, supra note 56, at 19.
74. Id. at 40.
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rights of the accused could select a particular test according to the result that test
would achieve.
2. The Texas Approach to Harmless Error
Texas has adopted its own approach to the determination of harmlessness.
The general Texas rule is: To be classified as harmless, the state must prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction
or to the punishment.""
In Harris v. State, 6 the court noted that the appellate court's role in
conducting a harmless error analysis is not to put itself in the place of the jury
and determine how it would have decided the case. Rather, the court is to
determine how the error affected the verdict. The court noted that an "over-
whelming evidence" test is an erroneous standard because the Texas statutory
rule focuses on the error itself and not the weight of the untainted evidence. The
court did acknowledge, however, that it was impossible to measure the effect of
the error without also considering the evidence that was properly before the
court. As such, it noted that the proper focus of the weight of the untainted
evidence of guilt is an assessment of whether overwhelming evidence dissipates
the error's effect upon the jury's function in determining the facts so that it did
not contribute to the verdict or punishment." Accordingly, the court set out
factors for appellate courts to consider in applying the rule:
1. the source and nature of the error;
2. the extent to which the state used the error throughout the course of
the trial;
3. the probable collateral implications of the error;
4. the probable weight a juror would put on such an error; and,
5. the likelihood that a finding of harmlessness would encourage the
State to repeat the error with impunity.
The reviewing court should apply these factors in light of the policies of
maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice process and a defendant's right
to a fair trial. 9 Moreover, the court should apply these factors within a two-
step framework. The court is first to isolate the error and its effects. Second,
75. Tex. R. App. P. 81(bX2). Thus, it appears that Texas has adopted the first approach
discussed in the previous subsection-the "contributed-to-the-verdict" tesL One important exception
to this rule, however, is that an error cannot be held harmless if it results from the violation of a
mandatory statute. However, a statute is not mandatory merely because of its obligatory language.
For a discussion of this exception, see Charles P. Bubany, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Criminal
Procedure: Trial and Appeal, 45 Sw. L.J. 293 (1991).
76. 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
77. Id. at 587.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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the court is to ask itself whether a rational trier of fact might have reached adifferent result if the error and its effect had not resulted.80
Although the Texas harmless error rule is essentially the "contributed-to-the-
verdict" test as discussed in the previous subsection, Texas has taken its analysis.
a step further. By providing factors with which other reviewing courts can work,
the Texas court has taken steps to maintain a balance of its policies, without rote
reliance on the United States Supreme Court.
IV. THE LOUISIANA EXPERIENCE
A. Louisiana's Statutory Harmless Error Rule
1. The Statutes
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:557 was Louisiana's original "harmless error"
provision." This provision was changed to Louisiana Code of CriminalProcedure article 921 in the 1966 revision of the Criminal Code. The new article
essentially retained the same language. 2 In 1979, the article was rewritten toprovide (as it presently does): "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by
an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which
does not affect substantial rights of the accused.""' On its face the statute
appears to provide a fair, easily-applicable standard for the accused-if the error
affects an accused's right that the court deems substantial, then the court should
reverse the conviction.
2. Jurisprudence Construing the Louisiana Harmless Error Statutes
For some time after Article 921's inception, the courts generally tended to
apply the statute textually. For example, in State v. Ferguson,4 the court held
80. Id. at 588. See also Arnold v. State, 786 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 498U.S. 838, Ii S. Ct. 110 (1990), in which the court set out nine factors for courts to determine
harmlessness in the context of parole law instruction.
81. La. R.S. 15:557 provided:
A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court on any ground unless inthe opinion of the court after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error
complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional
or statutory right.
1928 La. Acts No. 2, § 1, art. 557. It was while this article was in place that Dean Paul M. Hebert
wrote his law review article on prejudicial error in Louisiana. Hebert, supra note 3.82. 1966 La. Acts No. 310, § i. The Official Revision Comments note that the article retainsthe "sacramental" language of the former statute and omitted only the "unnecessary and cumbersome
verbiage." La. Code Crim. P. art. 921, official revision comment (a).
83. 1979 La. Acts No. 86, § I.
84. 187 La. 869,.175 So. 603 (1937).
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that the reversal of the order of challenging jurors by the trial judge violated a
substantial right guaranteed to the accused. At voir dire, nine veniremen had
been examined. Two of them were accepted by the state and the defendant. The
district attorney examined three more jurors and then tendered them to the
defense for examination. After the defense examined the prospective jurors, the
defense counsel tendered the prospective jurors back to the state for the state's
rejection or acceptance of them-before the defendant exercised his right to
accept or peremptorily reject them. The trial judge ruled: "[T]he 'district
attorney had the right to examine the jurors and tender them to counsel for
defendant for acceptance or rejection with the right on the part of the district
attorney to re-examine said jurors if he so desired and to accept or reject them
as he [saw] fit.'"ss Accordingly, defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges
before the jury panel was completed.
Justice Fournet, writing for the majority, noted the procedure employed by
the trial court's admission of error in its ruling."6 If the prospective juror is
tendered to the defense, after the juror has been examined on his voir dire, then
such is in itself an acceptance of the juror by the district attorney. The state
must exercise its right of challenge first and then present the juror to the
defendant for his acceptance or rejection." The court then held that the
improper procedure violated the accused's right to peremptorily challenge jurors
under Article I, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.8 Since this
right is substantial, the conviction must be reversed. 9
This case illustrates the court's textual application of the statutory harmless
error rule. The court neither conducted a balance of policies nor weighed the
evidence against the accused. Rather, the court merely applied the statute as it
was written.
85. Id. at 870, 175 So. at 603.
86. Id. at 873, 175 So. at 605. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:358 provided:
The jurors shall be tendered first to the prosecution, and, if accepted, then tendered to the
defense. After a juror has been accepted by both sides, neither side has the right to chal-
lenge him peremptorily, but it shall be within the discretion of the court, and not subject
to review to allow either side to peremptorily challenge jurors up to the time that the jury
is impaneled.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:359 provided: "Although a juror may have been accepted by both the
prosecution and the defense, he may, none the less, up to the beginning of the taking of evidence,
be challenged for cause by either side, or be excused either for cause or by consent of both sides."
These statutes were included in the 1966 revision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure as
Articles 788 and 795, respectively. 1966 La. Acts No. 310, § I.
87. Ferguson. 187 La. at 876, 175 So. at 605.
88. Louisiana Constitution article I, section 10 (1921) provided: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; and when tried
by jury shall have the right to challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of challenges to be fixed
by law." Cf La. Const. art. 1, § 17 (1974).
89. Ferguson, 187 La. at 876, 175 So. at 605.
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During this period, the court did not limit its definition of "substantial right"
to constitutional violations." For example, in State v. Robinson,"' the court
held that improperly-admitted opinion testimony was a violation of an accused's
substantial right. In State v. Ray, 2 the court held that the failure to tell the jury
that the court admitted a prior inconsistent statement only for credibility and not
as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt was reversible error.93
In theory there should be no difficulty in this area of law in Louisiana. The
legislature has spoken (long ago), and its message is clear: if an error affects
substantial rights of the accused, then the reviewing court should reverse the
conviction. The courts would only need to determine the definition of a
"substantial right." Arguably, this does not appear to be too difficult. It would
appear that nearly any violation of an evidentiary rule would be a violation of
a substantial right. As stated earlier, the rules of evidence were not designed in
90. Although the revised Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 921 did not keep the
exact language of former Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:557 ("substantial violation of a constitutional
or statutory right." (emphasis added)), the comments to Article 921 make it clear that no change was
intended, as the drafters kept the "sacramental language." The drafters omitted only the "unnecessary
and cumbersome verbiage." La. Code Crim. P. art. 921, official revision comment (a).
91. 223 La. 595, 66 So. 2d 515 (1953), on rehearing. In Robinson, a negligent homicide case,
a police officer who arrived at the accident scene thirty to forty-five minutes after the accident, was
qualified as an expert and was permitted to testify as to the speed of the vehicles. Cf. State v.
Maines, 183 La. 499, 164 So. 321 (1935) (holding an error in the admission of opinion evidence
harmless because the jury was just as competent to draw the conclusions as the witness); State v.
Scott, 221 La. 643, 60 So. 2d 71 (1952) (holding an error in the admission of opinion evidence
harmless).
92. 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971). Although the court did not require a motion for a
limiting instruction in this case, on rehearing, it did note that it would prospectively require such a
motion. Cf La. Code Evid. art. 105 and comment thereto.
93. Accord State v. Doucet, 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933) (reversible error when court
misinstructed the jury when the jury asked about mercy recommendations); State v. Gendusa, 190
La. 422, 182 So. 559 (1938) (omission in the indictment caused the judgment to be invalid, hence
reversible error); State v. Keen, 215 La. 577, 41 So. 2d 223 (1949) (failure to allow defendant to
cross examine state's witness as to previous indictments was reversible error when credibility of
witness was important); State v. Green, 231 La. 1058, 93 So. 2d 657 (1957) (judge's comment on
facts of case in overruling an objection was reversible error because the defendant should have been
granted a mistrial); State v. White, 244 La. 585, 153 So. 2d 401 (1963) (while defendant was not
present, the trial judge substituted an alternate juror when the judge had juror brought to chambers
and permitted him to state that he felt that there was a conflict of interest); State v. Johnson, 229 La.
476, 86 So. 2d 108 (1956) (reversible error when the trial judge refused to instruct the jury to
disregard gratuitous testimony relative to an oral confession). Cf. State v. Gunter, 180 La. 145, 156
So. 203 (1934) (harmless error to admit testimony of defendant's wife); State v. Killgore, 186 La.
233, 172 So. 2 (1937) (since defendant ultimately convicted of manslaughter, possible improper
exclusion of testimony which tended to reduce murder charge to manslaughter was harmless); State
v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 7 So. 2d 221 (1941 ) (harmless error when prosecutor asked and improper
question and withdrew it after the defendant's counsel objected but before the witness answered it);
and State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So. 2d 315 (1955) (no reversible error when trial judge refused
to appoint disinterested physicians to examine the defendant when an issue in the case was insanity
at the time of the alleged offense).
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a vacuum. Each rule, by balancing probative value, by excluding unreliable
evidence, by barring extraneous matter, and by guiding the judge and jury in the
proper performance of their decision-making functions, is intended to play a role
in the guarantee of a fair trial. The legislature, in enacting the evidence code,
enumerated certain rights that litigants have. If one right, for example the right
not to have hearsay evidence admitted at one's trial, is found harmless, then the
prosecutor will have no incentive to refrain from tendering the same type of
evidence the next time he tries a case. Moreover, trial judges will not have to
worry about reversal. The result is that certain rights guaranteed by the
legislature will become hollow.94
B. Louisiana's Jurisprudential Harmless Error Rule
In general, the recent Louisiana jurisprudence is riddled with inconsistent
applications of the harmless error rule. The trend appears to be that the courts
are holding all but the most blatant violations harmless. It is curious that Dean
Hebert remarked in 1932 that: "[I]n spite of these general principles, which, if
adhered to, would prevent reversals where justice has been done, in dealing with
the various classes of cases in which the problems arise we will note a tendency
of the Supreme Court to reverse many criminal cases when the error
might properly be considered harmless.""5 The pendulum now swings in
the other direction. With all due deference, it appears that either the
standard or policies are not fully understood or appreciated that "hard facts make
bad law."
In 1974, the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down the opinion of State v.
Michelli." In Michelli, a hearsay statement was admitted into evidence. The
supreme court evidenced its distrust of the harmless error standard by practically
disregarding the Chapman opinion, which was handed down just seven years
before. Instead, the court, in construing the pre-1979 language of Article 921,
relied on certain language from the 1946 decision of Kotteakos.9" The court
noted that an error which had little or no influence on the jury would neverthe-
less warrant a reversal if the error resulted from the departure of a constitutional
norm.9" Since there was a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory
right, the conviction would be reversed."
94. For a brief survey of some of the Louisiana jurisprudence construing the harmless error
rule's application to overruling a bill of particulars, arraignment, refusal of a continuance, and
selection of a jury, see Addison K. Goff, IV, Comment, Variations of a Common Theme: An
Analysis of Louisiana's Experience with Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 53 La. L. Rev. 1557,
1595-97 (1993).
95. Hebert, supra note 3, at 184.
96. 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
97. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946).
98. 301 So. 2d at 580.
99. Id.
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Moreover, the court expressly repudiated the "overwhelming evidence"
test."° The administration of the test requires that the entire trial record be
before the appellate court, and such a practice is contrary to the Louisiana
Constitution, which extends the appellate jurisdiction to questions of law
only.' The court also noted that the Louisiana courts are not as free
as the United States Supreme Court to institute new rules of law and
procedure where the legislature has spoken. Later that same year, the Louisiana
Supreme Court again repudiated the "overwhelming evidence" test in State v.
Herman. 2
Similarly, in State v. Muse,'° the supreme court again evidenced its
mistrust of the harmless error rule. In Muse, the defendant was charged with
using a pistol to commit a battery upon Jerome Hamilton. Hamilton was a
bystander victim of a drive-by-shooting-type incident. At trial, a state's witness
was questioned about the victim's reputation in the community. The prosecutor
objected. The judge sustained the objection. The trial judge reasoned that the
victim's general reputation in the neighborhood was strictly irrelevant and
immaterial to the issue before the court-especially since the victim was an
innocent bystander.'" The supreme court reversed.
Justice Summers, writing for the majority, noted that an attack on the
witness' credibility may have mitigated the evidence pointing to the guilt of
Muse. Thus, the trial court did not permit the defendant to fully cross examine
the state's witness--in violation of Article I, Section 16 of the Louisiana
Constitution.'05 Justice Summers further noted:
The right of confrontation occupies the status of a paramount and
fundamental right indispensable to a fair trial. It is a substantial,
substantive and valuable right which assures the accused that he shall
have the opportunity to be confronted by the witnesses against him and
this includes not only the right to attend the trial and hear the witnesses
but also the right to cross-examine them at the trial. It is a constitution-
al right, not a mere privilege."
100. Id. at 580-81.
101. Id. at 580 n.7 (citing La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1921)). C. La. Const. art. V, § 5(C)(1974), which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the
supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts. In criminal matters, its appellatejurisdiction extends only to questions of law." La. Const. art. V, § 10 (1974) provides similarly for
the courts of appeal.
102. 304 So. 2d 322, 325 (La. 1974), cert. dismissed, 421 U.S. 1006, 95 S. Ct. 2409 (1975).
The court followed the reasoning set forth in Michelli.
103. 319 So. 2d 920 (La. 1975).
104. Id. at 921.
105. Article 1, section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides in pertinent part: "An
accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him ......
106. Muse, 319 So. 2d at 922-23 (quoting State v. Giordano, 259 La. 155, 249 So. 2d 558
(1971)) (emphasis added).
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Although the opinion did not go into a detailed harmless error analysis, it
did refuse to hold the error harmless. Justice Summers reasoned: "We cannot
subscribe to the trial judge's opinion that the error was harmless for we do not
know what defense counsel may have elicited from the witness, nor its effect
upon the jury's determination of the defendant's guilt.'
0 7
This reasoning did not last, for later the same year the supreme court did an
"about face" and adopted the "overwhelming evidence" test in a line of cases that
did not even acknowledge the test's inconsistency with the constitution or
Michelli. This line of cases that utilized the "overwhelming evidence"test would
continue until 1980.08
In State v. Gibson,'"° the court returned to the Michelli end of the continu-
um. Although the court did not return to the strict language of Michelli as
Herman did, the court did return to the basic policies underlying the decisions.
In Gibson, the court noted that notwithstanding Article 92 I's amendment, the
Louisiana Constitution still extends appellatejurisdiction only to questions of law
in criminal matters." 0 Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court may not act as a
surrogate jury and "substitute its determination of what the jury, in the absence
of the error, would or should have decided in place of the jury's actual
verdict."' Accordingly, the court adopted the Chapman standard:
[T]he federal harmless error rule, as stated and applied in Chapman v.
California, is the standard most compatible with this Court's view of its
own criminal appellate jurisdiction. Whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the constitutional error complained of might have
contributed to the conviction is a question of law to which our appellate
jurisdiction extends.... Focusing on the incriminating quality of the
tainted evidence is less intrusive on' the jury's function than the
overwhelming evidence test."'
The court also noted that this standard is more consistent with the notion that
all accused persons, even if guilty, are entitled to a fair trial. "Injudicious
107. Muse, 319 So. 2d at 923. Accord State v. Murphy, 542 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1989) (holding
that a violation of the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation with an alleged child victim of
indecent behavior was not harmless error) and State v. Jenkins, 476 So. 2d 475 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1985) (holding it is prejudicial to limit a defendant's right to cross examine a state's witness about
that witness' criminal charges in order to show bias).
108. See. e.g., State v. Berain, 360 So. 2d 822 (La. 1978); State v. Meunier, 354 So. 2d 535 (La.
1978); State v. Stripling, 354 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1978); State v. Williams, 347 So. 2d 184 (La. 1977);
State v. Fort, 311 So. 2d 851 (La. 1975); and State v. Ivy, 307 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975). But see State
v. Murphy, 309 So. 2d 134 (La. 1975) (if supreme court finds that error constituted a substantial
violation of constitutional or statutory rights, court may not review record to determine whether there
is overwhelming independent evidence of defendant's guilt and find the error harmless.).
109. 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
110. Id. at 426 (citing La. Const. art V, § 5(C) (1974)).
I II. Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 427.
112. Id.
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application of the harmless error doctrine tends 'to shield from attack errors of
a most fundamental nature and thus to deprive many defendants of basic
constitutional rights."" 13
Notwithstanding the strong language of Gibson, the courts seemingly went
on as though nothing had ever happened. The "overwhelming evidence" test
again reared its head. "' However, it was not alone. In another line of cases,
the court was applying the "cumulative evidence" test. In State v. Banks,"' the
court of appeal for the fourth circuit noted that notwithstanding Gibson, several
cases since then had used both the "overwhelming evidence" test and the
"cumulative evidence" test. The court then applied the "cumulative evidence"
test and upheld the conviction." 6 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs
and reversed."'
In reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court evidenced a "lack of
enthusiasm" for the "cumulative evidence" test and "distinguished and seemingly
limited the post-Gibson cases.""' Presumably breathing new life into Gibson,
Chief Justice Dixon, writing for the majority, stated: "It cannot be said, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the improperly admitted hearsay ... did not contribute
to the verdict."" 9 However, the court would again turn around.' 20
113. Id. at 427 (quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 257, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1730
(1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
114. See, e.g., State v. Billiot, 421 So. 2d 864, 868 (La. 1982); State v. Quimby, 419 So. 2d
951, 958 (La. 1982); State v. Moore, 414 So. 2d 340, 345 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214,
103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983); State v. Perry, 408 So. 2d 1358, 1362 (La. 1982); State v. Smith, 408 So.
2d I 110, 1112-13 (La. 1981); State v. Connor, 403 So. 2d 678, 680 (La. 1981); and State v. Smith,
401 So. 2d 1179, 1182 (La. 1981).
115. 428 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 439 So. 2d 407 (1983). See also State v.
Lindsey, 404 So. 2d 466 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 261 (1983); State v.
Darby, 403 So. 2d 44 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152, 102 S. Ct. 1022 (1982); State v.
Spell, 399 So. 2d 551 (La. 1981); and State v. Bodlcy, 394 So. 2d 584 (La. 1981).
116. Banks, 428 So. 2d at 547. The court found itself bound to follow the dictate of Gibson in
rejecting the "overwhelming evidence" test. Id. at 546 n.2.
117. State v. Banks, 439 So. 2d 407 (La. 1983).
118. George W. Pugh & James R. McClelland, Evidence Developments in the Law: 1983-84,
45 La. L. Rev. 309, 324 (1984).
119. Banks, 439 So. 2d at 410 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Dixon reasoned:
The hearsay information injected into the case by the officer cannot be harmless. It
explained why the police were where they were, why they were on the lookout for
defendant, and why they approached him as soon as he was identified, wearing the clothes
described by the informer. Without the forbidden hearsay, the jury might have had
considerably more difficulty rejecting the testimony of the defense witness Gooden.
Id.
120. In State v. Creel, 540 So. 2d 511 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 169 (1989),
the court nonetheless applied the "cumulative evidence" test to hearsay testimony involving the
charges of attempted crime against nature and aggravated crime against nature. In Creel, the alleged
victim was punished by his bus driver for misconduct on the bus. The victim's older brother
approached the bus driver and asked that she not report the misconduct to the school authorities
because the brothers' foster father would force the victim to engage in oral copulation as punishment.
The bus driver then reported the brother's statement to the appropriate authorities. Accordingly, the
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In State v. Wille,'' the court applied several factors in determining that
erroneously admitted hearsay and irrelevant evidence did not "contribute to the
verdict." Those factors include "the importance of the witness' testimony in the
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and ... the overall strength of the prosecution's case."'"2 As such,
the court seemed to focus more on the properly admitted evidence than the
error.
23
In May 1991, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided State v. Cage.'24 In
Cage, the court dealt with the harmlessness of an erroneous jury instruction on
reasonable doubt given during the guilt phase of defendant's trial. In holding the
error harmless, the court relied heavily on the recent United States Supreme
Court decision of Arizona v. Fulminante.125 In so relying, the court distin-
guished between "trial errors" and "structural errors." Trial errors occur "during
the presentation of the case. . and may be assessed in the context of the other
evidence to determine whether its admission at trial is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 6 Structural errors, or structural defects in the trial mecha-
nism, affect the framework of the trial and consequently cannot be subjected to
a harmless error analysis.2 7  The court held that the erroneous jury
foster father was charged with aggravated crime against nature. At the trial the bus driver testified
to the above. The brother was not even called as a witness. Thus, the brother's out-of-court
statement was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and was clearly hearsay. La. Code
Evid. arts. 801-806 (1995). The court held that the error was harmless. Arguably, the problem with
this reasoning is that some foster children do not care for their foster parents. Therefore, there was
at least a possible incentive for the older brother to lie. Furthermore, when the facts and
circumstances are viewed as a whole, there could have been a situation in which the older brother
was merely coming to the rescue of his younger brother to keep him out of trouble. If the brother
were called to the stand, then the jury could have weighed the credibility of the brother; hence, the
policies underlying the hearsay rules would be satisfied. Although, the foregoing is mainly
hypothesis, the court should have at least given it consideration. Instead, the court held the error
harmless because the bus driver's testimony was essentially the same as the victim's testimony. This
case is an example of the problems which surround the court's switching back and forth between
harmless error approaches. It also illustrates the problems within this area of law in general.
121. 559 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1990), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 880, 113 S. CL 231 (1992).
122. Id. at 1332 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdell, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438
(1986)).
123. See also State v. Hawkins, 688 So. 2d 473 (La. 1997) (applying Wille factors to hearsay
evidence) and State v. Harris, 711 So. 2d 266 (La. 1998) (applying Wille factors to improper
character evidence).
124. 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991) (on remand from the United States Supreme Court, 498 U.S.
39, it1 S. CL 328 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 874, 112 S. Ct. 211 (1991)).
125. 499 U.S. 279, III S. Ct. 1246 (1991). Fulminante held that illegally admitted coerced
confessions are subject to a harmless error analysis.
126. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1127.
127. Id. Examples cited by the court of structural errors are provided in the following cases:
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (selection of a jury with racially based
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instruction was a trial error and thus was subject to a harmless error
analysis. '
When it applied the harmless error analysis, the court did not apply the Wille
factors or even cite a single Louisiana case. Rather, it relied entirely on the
federal jurisprudence. In particular, it relied on the federal jurisprudential
interpretations of Chapman and held that the Chapman standard "mandates
consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitution-
al errors that may be harmless."'' The court then proceeded to analyze the
facts of the case under the "overwhelming evidence" test: "Because of the
overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's guilt, the erroneous reasonable
doubt instruction given ... during the guilt phase of trial was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." ' 30 The court then switched into a sufficiency analysis
when analyzing the instruction's effect on the sentencing stage of the trial. 3'
Ironically, the court concluded:
Viewing the record as a whole, the jury had sufficient evidence to find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .... The erroneous
instruction by the trial judge did not contribute to defendant's convic-
tion or sentence. Accordingly, the erroneous instruction was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.'
2
The jurisprudence since Cage has also sent mixed signals. In State v.
Smith,' the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a Cage-like jury instruction
exclusions); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986) (exclusion of members of
defendant's race from grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984) (violation
of the right to a public trial); MeKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168. 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984) (denial of
right to self-representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct 792 (1963)
(complete denial of counsel); and Turney v. Ohio, 273' U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927) (impartial
judge).
128. But see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. CL 2078 (1993). In Sullivan, the
United States Supreme Court rejected Louisiana's position that the erroneous reasonable doubt
instruction was a trial error. Q. State v. Richardson, 648 So. 2d 945'(La. App. 5th Cir. 1994)
(distinguished Sullivan and found an erroneous jury charge regarding self-defense to be harmless
error).
129. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1128 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 n.7, 103
S. Ct. 1974, 1981 n.7 (1983)).
130. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1128.
131. Id. at 1129.
132. Id. (emphasis added). For other recent cases incorporating some sort of "o%rwhelming
evidence" test or "sufficiency of the evidence" test, see State v. lier, 723 So. 2d 939 (La. 1998),
petition for cert. filed (Feb. 17, 1999) (No. 98-8143); State v. Taylor, 663 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1995); State v. Coleman, 673 So. 2d 1283 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996), writ denied, 703 So. 2d II
(1997); and State v. Evans, 712 So. 2d 941 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998). C. State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d
1125, 1129-30 (La. 1991) (Lemrnmon, J., concurring) ("[A] harmless error analysis requires more than
excising the evidence or other error and reviewing the remainder of the record for sufficiency under
Jackson v. Virginia, [443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979)].").
133. 600 So. 2d 1319, 1326 (La. 1992).
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was not harmless. Noting Justice Lemmon's concurrence in Cage,34 Justice
Cole, writing for the majority, applied the "contributed-to-the-verdict"test, citing
among other cases, State v. Gibson.'3'
In State v. Code,"6 the court held that erroneously admitted expert
testimony on an ultimate issue was harmless: "Considering the admissible
evidence concerning the palm prints, no rational juror could find those facts
without also finding the ultimate fact of the defendant's guilt.""' In State v.
Johnson,3s the court, in overruling a long line of jurisprudence, held that an
error in admitting other crimes evidence was subject to a harmless error
analysis. " In conducting that analysis, the court merely looked at the
remaining, properly admitted evidence. 4
In State v. Quatrevingt,"' the court separately analyzed two errors in a
first degree murder case. First, regarding an error in admitting DNA evidence,
the court stated: "We have carefully considered all of the other evidence in this
case and conclude that the jury's verdict of guilty of first degree murder was
surely unattributable to the error. . ." Second, the court held: "Given the
amount of other credible evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt and the
defendant's admission of the prior incidents, ... the trial court's error was
harmless."'43
This jagged line of Louisiana high court jurisprudence on harmless error has
also taken its toll on the appellate courts. For example, in State v. Morris,4
the trial court had erroneously admitted the victim's taped statement in an
aggravated rape case. Notwithstanding the fact that the court of appeal was
"concerned about the effect of the statement on the jury because the jury
exhibited an interest in it during deliberations,""' the court held that the error
did not require reversal, because, inter alia, the "jury had other properly
submitted evidence it could have relied on.""11 6
What is the Louisiana standard? The question is not easily answered,
inasmuch as the courts have not been consistent in their analyses or standards
when applying the harmless error test. Furthermore, the courts have for the most
part strayed from a statutory approach to harmless error and instead just quote
federal jurisprudential "rules."
134. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1129-30 (Lemmon, I., concurring).
135. 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
136. 627 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S. Ct. 1870 (1994).
137. Id. at 1385.
138. 664 So. 2d 94 (La. 1995).
139. Id. at 102.
140. Id.
141. 670 So. 2d 197 (La. 1996).
142. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis added).
144. 691 So. 2d 792 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 703 So. 2d 609 (1997).
145. Id. at 805 (empasis added).
146. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The reasoning of recent jurisprudence such as Morris is disturbing. The
courts have apparently disregarded the sound reasoning of Gibson. In doing so,
they have ignored both Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 921 (Is the
right to have illegal other crimes evidence admitted against you not a substantial
right?) and Article V, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. Although the
Louisiana Supreme Court has inserted into the jurisprudence some factors to
guide the lower courts on the rule's application, the analysis is improper,
inasmuch as it focuses more on the properly admitted evidence than the error
itself. 7 Many courts are not even using those factors. As such, the courts are
compounding the unpredictability of the Louisiana law in this area. Although
one may agree with the courts because the defendant apparently "did it," such a
conclusion misses the point. All accused citizens, guilty or not, deserve a fair
trial. Allowing a court to look at the record and weigh the facts in this manner
is an upside down interpretation.
Accordingly, if the courts are not going to textually apply Article 921, then
they should at least return to the Gibson standard, streamlined by the five-factor
approach used by the Texas courts. Again these factors are: (1) the source and
nature of the error; (2) the extent to which the state used the error throughout the
course of the trial; (3) the probable collateral implications of the error; (4) the
probable weight a juror would put on such an error; and (5) the likelihood that
a finding of harmlessness would encourage the prosecution to repeat the error
with impunity.
These factors clearly focus on the main points of the "contributed-to-the-
verdict" approach, which is arguably the most consistent with the power of the
Louisiana courts. If the court were to use these factors, then the standard of
review as well as the important policies would be clear to courts in the future.
Moreover, the courts would be kept in line with their constitutional mandate-no
appellate review of facts. Furthermore, in using this test, the courts would still
be taking into consideration the economics of justice. Accordingly, the best
policy balance would be made, and that jagged line of Louisiana harmless error
cases would finally be straightened out.
VI. CONCLUSION
For some period after the inception of Louisiana's statutory harmless error
rule, the courts tended to try to textually apply the statute. However, such has
not been the case in recent years. The Louisiana courts have vacillated among
the various jurisprudentially created harmless error "tests"-often in contraven-
tion of an accused's "substantial rights." Thus, with the harmless error doctrine
147. See State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1332-33 (La. 1990), cer. denied, 506. U.S. 880. 113
S. Ct. 231 (1992).
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in such a flux right now, the Louisiana courts should reexamine the policies they
wish to promote in this area of law. As such, the integrity of the criminal justice
system and the provision of a fair trial to all should top the list. Regardless of
the test used, if the test is changed every two or three years, then neither of these
policies is promoted. Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court should pick one
test and stay with it so the rule can develop. If the courts must use the
jurisprudential rules instead of textual, statutory analysis, then the Gibson
approach is preferable. If the courts apply this approach by using the Texas
courts' factors, then they will, while still providing a balance to the economics
of judicial review, provide a fair standard that is in line with the criminal
appellate jurisdiction provided by the Louisiana Constitution. For, as the late
Dean Paul M. Hebert noted:
The problem of prejudicial error is a problem in professional psycholo-
gy. No rules can be framed which will solve it, for rules can only be
drawn in general terms, and it is in the interpretation of the rules that
the difficulty comes."
148. Hebert, supra note 3, at 170 (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate
Review, 5 Tex. L Rev. 126, 146-47 (1926)).
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